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Foucault, Ferguson, and civil society 
Samantha Ashenden, Birkbeck College  
 
ABSTRACT: In contrast to those who trace civil society to “community” per se, Foucault is 
keen to locate this concept as it emerges at a particular moment in respect of specific exigen-
cies of government. He suggests that civil society is a novel way of thinking about a problem, 
a particular problematization of government that emerges in the eighteenth century and 
which combines incommensurable conceptions of the subject as simultaneously a subject of 
right and of interests. This article takes up Foucault’s discussion of the Scottish Enlightenment 
in The Birth of Biopolitics to trace the distinctiveness of his discussion of civil society, but also in 
order to suggest that we ought to pay closer attention to the tensions between commercial-
civilizational and civic republican themes in the literature of the late eighteenth century than 
does Foucault. It is my tentative suggestion that Foucault’s account leaves out significant as-
pects of these debates that offer counter-valences to the dominant models of the subject avail-
able to contemporary political discourse.  
Keywords: civic virtue; Ferguson; genealogy; intellectual history; interests; society 
 
This article stems from a puzzle I generated for myself whilst reading Foucault’s The Birth of 
Biopolitics.1 Its focus is a small but significant moment in the text of those lectures, where Fou-
cault alights upon Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) to exemplify the 
emergence of the subject of interests.2 I’d read Ferguson’s essay some time prior to reading 
Foucault’s lectures, and had a firm sense that “my” Ferguson, the highlander, republican 
thinker from the late eighteenth century was an odd fit with “Foucault’s Ferguson,” the pur-
veyor of commercial society and its interests. I decided to push this lack of fit between the two 
Fergusons. What precisely was and is at stake here? Is this just a minor argument with Fou-
cault in which he holds up his hands and disclaims “I’m not a professional historian”? Fou-
                                                          
 Thanks to James Brown, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Andreas Hess, Tom Osborne and two anony-
mous reviewers for helpful discussions and for comments on previous drafts of this text.  
1 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, edited by Michel Senellart, 
translated by Graham Burchell (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).  
2 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966 
[1767]). 
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cault’s reading of seventeenth and eighteenth century writers such as Locke, Hume, Smith, 
and Ferguson is a reading across several texts in order to draw together from disparate 
sources the outline of a new figure that he claims is emerging, the subject of interests; its aim is 
not a detailed intellectual history but a genealogy of the present. Moreover, The Birth of Biopoli-
tics is a lecture course and not a scholarly text with all the usual trappings of scholarly appa-
ratus. So, my argument should not be read as a complaint that Foucault was insufficiently pro-
fessional as an historian of ideas, but rather in the spirit of disclosing how there were more 
and different possibilities in this moment of the formation of “civil society” in the late eight-
eenth century than Foucault’s text suggests. I’m intrigued that a reader as original and atten-
tive as Foucault should obliterate the civic republicanism of Ferguson’s essay. This is arresting, 
because it is so obvious an omission.  
 Eighteenth century Scottish debates conceived a model of progress as “civilization” 
through the development of commerce, civility, and market exchange; “civil society” was ad-
vanced society, civil being related to civilised and polite, as opposed to the rude, savage, and 
barbarian. Within this newly conceived understanding of civilization, eighteenth century writ-
ers contested the relationship between wealth and virtue: if civil society produced moral pro-
gress through a refinement of manners, was this inversely related to civic virtue? Could 
wealth and virtue be generated together or were they in tension with each other?3 Foucault 
was keenly aware of the novelty of the Scottish Enlightenment and interested in the ways in 
which its authors produced a newly historicised conception of society. His interest in this in 
The Birth of Biopolitics reflects a longstanding concern for the transformations in a number of 
orders of knowledge in the eighteenth century as evidenced, for example, by his discussion of 
the emergence of political economy in The Order of Things.4 
Ferguson is a transitory figure in late eighteenth century Scottish debates about the re-
lationship between wealth and virtue.5 Foucault focuses on Ferguson in the service of provid-
ing a map of a new figure: the subject of interests. His sketch of this subject takes place in the 
course of lectures given across 1978 and 1979, whose overall concern is to outline a history of 
governmentality. In this, civil society plays a distinctive role. But what Foucault takes to be 
antonyms (possibly for sake of clarity given the lecture format, or maybe because of his carto-
graphic way of proceeding), the subject of interest and the subject of right, are perhaps better 
framed, following Burchell, as ambiguities of a new ethico-political model of the subject.6 And 
here we encounter not just the subject of right versus the subject of interest, but a triangle: the 
                                                          
3 See Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue: the shaping of political economy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Cambridge: CUP, 1983); Jose Harris, (ed.), Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, Insti-
tutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
4 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 1970 [1966]). 
There is unfortunately no space here to develop a comparison between Foucault’s treatment of political 
economy in these two texts.  
5 A debate that has not gone away, see, e.g. Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Mar-
kets (London: Allen Lane, 2012).  
6 Graham Burchell, “Peculiar Interests: civil society and governing ‘the system of natural liberty’,” in Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: studies in governmentality, (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1991), 122.  
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subject of right, the subject of interest, and the subject of civic virtue. While the first two terms 
will become increasingly dominant from the nineteenth century onwards, all three figures are 
present in the eighteenth century Scottish debate.  
 The argument proceeds as follows. Section one provides an account of Foucault’s anal-
ysis of civil society as emerging in the eighteenth century, where this combines the heteroge-
neous figures the subject of right and the subject of interest. The second section attempts to 
locate Foucault’s account in relation to the work of intellectual historians who have analysed 
the conceptual flux of the period. Section three then develops a discussion of Foucault’s read-
ing of Ferguson, suggesting that this contains unhelpful moments of anachronism and abstrac-
tion on Foucault’s part, and arguing that in Ferguson’s work we can locate a distinctively civic 
conception of the subject that is missed by Foucault. This discussion is conducted with the aim 
of retrieving from the late eighteenth century debates a moment when other possibilities of 
politics were present. Foucault’s account, perceptive though it is of the ways in which we are 
governed now, closes toward the present. Others have suggested that there is a potentially 
productive complementarity between the work of Foucault and that of intellectual historians 
such as Quentin Skinner and John Pocock; there would be great merit in further work bringing 
together Foucault’s genealogical approach with work in intellectual history.7 
 
Foucault on civil society 
Civil society has recently been a rallying cry as well as a site for sociological analysis. John 
Hall observes that in contemporary discussions of civil society hope has tended to replace 
analysis, “civil society designates both a normative horizon and a description of a sociological 
condition”; John Dunn is more scathing, charging most current uses of the term with “irreme-
diable vagueness.”8 Foucault’s take on civil society usefully deflates the idea that civil society 
offers an unproblematic normative horizon.9 Reflecting on his own practice at the beginning of 
the Birth of Biopolitics, we find Foucault stating that he intends to begin from governmental 
practice, to refuse to take given ideas such as the state, civil society, sovereignty, and so on, as 
primary or original. Thus where the proponents of civil society as a source of resistance to the 
status quo tend to gesture to a space outside power, Foucault prefers to attempt to provide 
                                                          
7 See in particular Burchell, “Peculiar Interests,” and Colin Gordon, “Foucault in Britain,” in Andrew Barry, 
Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationali-
ties of government (London: UCL Press, 1996).  
8 John A. Hall, “Reflections on the making of civility in society,” in Frank Trentmann (ed.), Paradoxes of Civil 
Society: new perspectives on modern German and British history (Oxford: Bergham Books, 2000), 47; John Dunn, 
“The contemporary political significance of John Locke’s conception of civil society,” in Sudipta Kaviraj and 
Sunil Khilnani (eds.) Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 40. Of course, not all writ-
ers on civil society can be charged with vacuity; some have developed thoughtful and nuanced accounts, for 
example see Jeffrey Alexander, The Civil Sphere (Oxford: OUP, 2006) and Real Civil Societies: dilemmas of insti-
tutionalization (London: Sage, 1998); John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988); Adam B. 
Seligman The Idea of Civil Society (New York: The Free Press, 1992).  
9 Samantha Ashenden, “Questions of Criticism: Foucault and Habermas on civil society and resistance,” in 
Samantha Ashenden and David Owen (eds.) Foucault Contra Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue Between Geneal-
ogy and Critical Theory (London: Sage, 1999), 143-165. 
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genealogical reflection on how such entities are formed.10 This informs his conception of civil 
society as a transactional rather than primordial reality, and thus his refusal of the idea that it 
is a phenomenon that simply “asserts itself, struggles, and rises up, which revolts against and 
is outside government or the state.”11 His, then, is a prosaic demand for closer attentiveness to 
the processes by which we’ve become what we are. We can pursue this by examining Fou-
cault’s reflections on liberalism in The Birth of Biopolitics. 
 
Liberalism does not derive from juridical thought any more than it does from an economic 
analysis. It is not born from the idea of a political society founded on a contractual bond.12 
In The Birth of Biopolitics Foucault observes that “civil society” is “the correlate of the liberal art 
of government.”13 Civil society is, he suggests, a “transactional reality” borne in an attempt to 
answer the question “how to govern, according to the rules of right, a space of sovereignty 
which for good or ill is inhabited by economic subjects.”14 
Civil society is [...] the correlate of a technology of government the rational measure of which 
must be juridically pegged to an economy understood as process of production and  ex-
change. The problem of civil society is the juridical structure (économie juridique) of a gov-
ernmentality pegged to the  economic structure (économie économique).15 
 
Referring to eighteenth century debates, Foucault suggests that the notion of civil society ena-
bled the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment to avoid the “theoretical and juridical problem 
of the original constitution of society.”16 Clarifying his position, Foucault notes that this should 
not be taken to imply that the juridical problem of the exercise of power disappears—it con-
tinues—“but the way in which it is posed is reversed.”17 Foucault observes that in seventeenth 
and eighteenth century contractarian arguments the search was for “a juridical form at the 
origin of society [...] which would limit the exercise of political power in advance.”18 By con-
trast, theorists of civil society from the late eighteenth century to today formulate the problem 
as one of how to delimit power within a society that is already extant: “With its juridical struc-
ture and institutional apparatus, what can the state do and how can it function in relation to 
something, society, which is already given?”19 This formulation draws attention to the reversal 
of assumptions that occurs in the political thinking of the late eighteenth century. Up until this 
time, it is fair to say that “society” was conceived as politically constituted, and the key prob-
lem was therefore the political institution of society; note, for example, that Locke does not dif-
                                                          
10 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 2-7. See also Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Paul Rab-
inow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (London: Penguin, 1986).  
11 Ibid., 297. 
12 Ibid., 321.  
13 Ibid., 291. 
14 Ibid., 297, 295-6.  
15 Ibid., 296. 
16 Ibid., 308. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 309. 
19 Ibid. 
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ferentiate political society and society/civil society.20 In late eighteenth century debates such as 
those of the Scottish Enlightenment, this is reversed: social order is posited as developing 
through man’s natural sociability, and the problem of government is centrally a problem of 
how to provide property and the rules of justice with a stable foundation. In this latter concep-
tion, society is itself regarded as preceding government. We can see this, for example, in the 
way Adam Ferguson refuses a Hobbesian state of nature: for Ferguson man is always already 
sociable.21 It is also evident in Adam Smith’s argument against mercantilism: attempts at the 
centralised political ordering of exchange cannot but produce problems because the sphere of 
market exchange is a dense web of interactions prior and opaque to sovereignty. Smith re-
sponds to the idea that grain is a political commodity with a moral but also (and crucially) an 
epistemological critique: mercantilism is wrongheaded because the kind of knowledge of 
markets that would be necessary to make it succeed is not available.22 
 What Foucault is pointing to here is a transformation, also recognised by intellectual 
historians and some social theorists, whereby from the eighteenth century on a proto-
sociological account of social order progressively displaces the question of the political foun-
dations of society. Or, to put the matter differently, he’s sketching an account of the emergence 
of the social, and of the idea of society as a system of interconnections amongst strangers that, 
beginning in the eighteenth century, overtakes older connotations of “society” as companion-
ship or fellowship.23 Foucault’s analysis of this new formation is striking in its originality and 
its capacity to apprehend the minutiae of power relations. He writes about a doubling of forms 
of rule within modern political rationalities, whereby we are simultaneously juridically and 
biopolitically constituted: the modern state addresses us both as citizens with rights, and as 
subjects of pastoral supervision and biopolitical intervention. On the one hand we are gov-
erned according to the rules of right, and on the other hand we are governed through norms 
immanent to population. This gives a distinctive way of analysing the operation of modern 
power and, contrary to many uses of the term “civil society” to refer to a domain outside pow-
er, suggests that the autonomous individuals of civil society are not outside governance so 
much as constituted by and through it; that is from this point of view, civil society is a transac-
tional reality constituted by and through relations of rights and norms, it is not “outside” gov-
ernment.24 
 Senellart, commenting on the text of the lectures, observes that what Foucault is de-
scribing is the process by which, during the eighteenth century, the “principle of the external 
limitation of raison d’Etat by right is replaced by a principle of internal limitation in the form of 
the economy.”25 Indeed, Foucault suggests that the idea of civil society effects a re-centring of 
political reason from the idea of the necessity of wisdom on the part of governors, to the idea 
                                                          
20 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: CUP, 1988 [1688]). 
21 Ferguson, Essay. 
22 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 283. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Glasgow: Liberty Fund, 1981 [1776]). 
23 Raymond Williams, Keywords (London: Fontana, 1976), 244. This is an idea taken up by, amongst others, 
Durkheim and Tönnies. 
24 Ashenden, “Questions of Criticism.” 
25 Foucault Birth of Biopolitics, 327. 
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of calculation; and that as such government is not pegged to truth but to rationality.26 Foucault 
seems to conceive this as a move from the moral to the economic. In a sense he’s obviously 
right: arguably one of the most significant features of Smith’s Wealth of Nations was to move 
debates about value from the theological to the empirical register. Opening up with the proto-
sociological move that Smith makes is a notion that the human sciences can be positively 
founded. Foucault comments that with respect to the task of the political ordering of markets, 
mercantilism, the case is not “you must not” but “you cannot,” an epistemological not a moral 
criticism.27 Insofar as this is the case then government is indeed pegged not to truth but to ra-
tionality.28 But it may be a mistake to think that this signals the transition from a moral order-
ing of relations to an epistemological one; rather, one might argue that the thinkers of the Scot-
tish Enlightenment were establishing a new moral economy, in which subjects of government 
disclose their own truth through the articulation of interests. Smith, Ferguson and others 
would certainly not have dissociated the epistemological and the moral. To examine this fur-
ther we need to dig a little more deeply into eighteenth century debates and, in particular, into 
Foucault’s account of them. 
 
A Faustian dissociation of sensibility29 
Koselleck describes the period from 1750 to 1850 as a Sattelzeit, a period of conceptual flux 
during which modern constellations of meaning emerged.30 In a similar vein, Pocock writes of 
a “Faustian dissociation of sensibility” in the late eighteenth century, involving a split between 
civic and civil conceptions of subjectivity.31 Foucault’s reflections on civil society take place in 
the context of his thinking through precisely these transformations of the late eighteenth cen-
tury. Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics is a reflection on this moment, an account of this shift that 
gives us a valuable way of analysing contemporary power relations, but his conceptualisation 
leaves out several features of late eighteenth century discourse that, when incorporated into 
his account, can help to develop and refine it. In particular, Foucault presents the newly form-
ing ethical subject of civil society in terms of an antinomy between the subject of right and the 
subject of interest. This enables him to capture certain salient features of our political land-
scapes, but closer attention to the literature of the period suggests much more ambiguity than 
is captured by this bivalent model. Burchell points out that in the eighteenth century individu-
al self-interest becomes a problem in a newly forming ethico-political model of the subject: 
“this individual living being, the subject of particular interests, represents a new figure of so-
cial and political subjectivity, the prototype of ‘economic man’ who will become the correlate 
and instrument of a new art of government.”32 This section explores this, in the hope of restor-
                                                          
26 Ibid., 311. See also Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Mil-
ler (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
27 Foucault Birth of Biopolitics, 283. 
28 Ibid., 311.  
29 John G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), 69. 
30 Keith Tribe, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical 
Time (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985), x.  
31 Pocock, Virtue, 69. 
32 Burchell, “Peculiar interests,” 122, 127. 
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ing a greater range of possibilities for the subject suggested by Burchell’s “will become.” In 
other words, before the subject of right and economic man achieved their contemporary stand-
off, if that’s what it is, what other rival conceptions of subjectivity existed and how were these 
eclipsed? 
 We can begin thinking about the “Faustian dissociation” of civic and civil conceptions 
of subjectivity in the late eighteenth century by reflecting briefly on the dual sense of commu-
nity that occurs in Kant’s work. One the one hand Kant writes of a “universal community”: 
sensus communis, public sense, collective reason; on the other hand he writes of the prejudice of 
vulgar common sense.33 This twofold idea of community is linked in turn to an ambiguity at-
tending the idea of Gemeinschaft, which can mean both communion and commercium. Communio 
implies fortification, the exclusive sharing of space protected from the outside; Commericum 
implies potentially unlimited exchange and communication. Kant argues that without the lat-
ter, the former, the localised community, would never be known.34 This ambiguity between 
communio and commercium plays through eighteenth century Scottish political economy in its 
confluence of republican and commercial ideas. Foucault’s portrayal of these themes flattens 
this.  
 Echoing the observations of the writers he has under analysis, Foucault notes a para-
dox:  
 
Homo oeconomicus is someone who pursues his own interests, and whose interest is such that 
it converges spontaneously with the interest of others. From the point of view of a theory of 
government, homo oeconomicus is the person who must be let alone. With regard to homo oe-
onomicus, one must laisser-faire; he is the subject or object of laissez-faire.35 
 
And yet this person who must be let alone is also one who responds to government. He “ap-
pears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic 
modifications artificially introduced into the environment. Homo oeconomicus is someone who 
is eminently governable.”36 Thus from being the partner of laissez faire, this subject becomes a 
site for modification. Homo oeconomicus is thus the “partner, the vis-à-vis, and the basic ele-
ment of the new governmental reason formulated in the eighteenth century.”37 He is both a 
principle of intelligibility and a means of governmentality. He is Robert Musil’s “man without 
qualities.”38 
 Foucault counterpoises the subject of interest to the subject of right. He claims that 
these are two heterogeneous structures of the subject, both of which animate eighteenth centu-
ry discourse.39 To approach the former he refers to David Hume. He notes that in the empiri-
cism of Locke and Hume there appears “the form of a subject of individual choices which are 
                                                          
33 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, translated by J. Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952) 
34 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).  
35 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 270.  
36 Ibid., 270.  
37 Ibid., 271.  
38 Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities, translated by Sophie Wilkins and edited by Burton Pike (London: 
Picador, 1995 [1978]).  
39 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 276.  
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both irreducible and non-transferable.”40 Foucault claims that English empiricism generates a 
formation of the subject that is novel; it “reveals something which absolutely did not exist be-
fore.”41 Eighteenth century debates concerning what animates this subject, including self-
preservation, the body or the soul, sympathy, and so on, are not, according to Foucault, what 
is important: “What is important is the appearance of interest for the first time as a form of 
both immediate and absolutely subjective will.”42 Homo oeconomicus is the basic element in 
the new governmental formulation because his interests are spontaneously self-generating. 
But his twin, the subject of right, has a different formation.  
 The subject of right is a figure rooted in natural law arguments. As such, he has natural 
rights, but becomes a subject of right proper only by transferring these in the act of contracting 
to form a legitimate political authority. Thus this subject “agrees to self-renunciation and splits 
himself.”43 On one hand he possesses natural and immediate rights, and on the other hand he 
gives these up in order to become a subject of right under a civil constitution. Foucault ob-
serves that this introduces a dialectic of self-transcendence of one part of the subject over the 
other, and that it institutes a relation of “negativity, renunciation, and limitation” between the 
two that founds law and prohibition. By comparison, “the subject of interest is never called 
upon to relinquish his interest.”44 
 This dual conception of the subject contains two key features. First, juridical will does 
not take over from interest, rather interest remains irreducible to the juridical will: “The sub-
ject of interest constantly overflows the subject of right.”45 Second, the two are governed by 
different logics, the logic of spontaneous self-generation versus the logic of self-renunciation 
and transcendence. In sum: “In the eighteenth century the figure of homo oeconomicus and the 
figure of [...] homo juridicus or homo legalis are absolutely heterogeneous and cannot be super-
imposed on each other.”46 In Foucault’s account the spontaneous formation of the subject of 
interest thus stands opposed to the “pactum subjectionis” of the jurists.47 
 Foucault offers a very subtle account here. He observes that homo oeconomicus func-
tions within a totality that eludes him and which nevertheless founds the rationality of his 
egoistic choices.48 Foucault is attentive to the ambiguity of the apparent lack of transcendence 
of the subject of interests; it is not that transcendence has disappeared, but rather that it has 
become opaque and is rendered statistically. This in turn sustains the notion that society is a 
statistical idea, as it is figured, for example, in the concept of population.49 This implies that 
what we’re talking about is a changed orientation of the subject to his (sic) interests and to the 
                                                          
40 Ibid., 272.  
41 Ibid., 273.  
42 Ibid,. Colin Gordon notes the connection between Foucault’s comments and the work of Didier Deleule on 
Hume. Both present Hume as a thinker for whom the real is an accomplished form of the possible. See Gor-
don, “Foucault in Britain,” 259.  
43 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 275.  
44 Ibid., 275.  
45 Ibid., 274.  
46 Ibid., 276.  
47 Ibid., 303.  
48 Ibid., 278.  
49 See Foucault, “Governmentality.”  
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whole, dissociation from preceding forms of totality and immersion in an emerging statistical 
account of population.50 That is, there is a move from fellowship and civics to civility among 
strangers. Foucault suggests that this is achieved through a focus on interests, but attention to 
fellowship and civics is neither missing from Smith’s account, nor, as we will see, from Fergu-
son’s.51 
 To examine this more closely I want to explore some of the ways in which in eighteenth 
century discussion the tension between the civic and the civil produced a number of instabili-
ties and paradoxes. What Foucault phrases as different and irreconcilable conceptions of the 
subject, intellectual historians have tended to regard as a paradox of civilization.52 In the writ-
ings of the Scottish Enlightenment, for example, the strength of the civic bond and the figure 
of the virtuous citizen are seen as sustaining the development of an increasingly complex divi-
sion of labour and accompanying differentiation of tasks (in particular civil and military), 
growth of material wealth and refinement of manners and mores, to the point where this dif-
ferentiation and refinement itself begins to threaten the civic bond.53 This argument is particu-
larly evident in Adam Ferguson’s Essay, though it also runs through Smith’s Wealth of Nations, 
especially if one reads Book V on public works. It is, at its broadest, a concern with the relation 
between civil and civic life, wealth and virtue.54 
 Thus in the texts of the Scottish Enlightenment there is a third form of the subject, the 
subject of republican virtue, that is strangely absent from Foucault’s account of the emergence 
of civil society, even though concern for political participation comes through some of his oth-
er writings.55 This subject of virtue stands neither for law and juridical order, the subject of 
right, nor for commerce, Foucault’s subject of interests, but for an older and distinctly republi-
can idea(l) combining bravery in battle and participation in collective order. It is tempting to 
read this omission of Foucault’s in terms of a difference of context between the revolutionary 
tradition in France and the comparative pragmatism of the Scottish moralists. Where the 
                                                          
50 See Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: CUP, 1990) and Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern 
Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1998). 
51 As regards Smith’s concern with fellowship and civics, see Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(Glasgow: Liberty Fund, 2009), also see The Wealth of Nations. Richard Whatmore argues that Say reads Smith 
as seeking to unite virtue and self-interest; political economy concerned manners as well as wealth (See 
Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution: and Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Politi-
cal Economy (Oxford: OUP, 2000)). 
52 See, for example, Frank Trentmann (ed.), Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and 
British History (Berghahn, 2000); Harris, Civil Society in British History. 
53 See in particular Pocock’s discussion of this process, in John G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Flor-
entine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: PUP, 1975), Chapter 14. 
54 See Hont and Ignatieff, Wealth and Virtue.  
55 See, for example, his attention to participative models of political community. Foucault comments acerbi-
cally that in the present, like asking for “lemon and milk” in our tea, we attempt simultaneously to enact two 
divergent models of political community: the city-citizen game of juridical equality and the shepherd-flock 
game of a secularized Christian pastoral (Michel Foucault, “Lemon and Milk,” in James D. Faubion (ed.), 
Robert Hurley (trans.), Power: the Essential Works 3 (London: Allen Lane, 2001); See also Michel Foucault, Poli-
tics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: 
Routledge, 1988).  
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French Enlightenment and revolution raised in particularly stark form the question of the ju-
ridical coding of the subject and power, the Scottish moralists’ realism, consequentialism, and 
recognition of the opacity of social relations perhaps allowed a space for questions about vir-
tue to linger (maybe these died in France in the wake of the Terror?)56According to recent 
scholarship something of this Scottish pragmatism came through in France with those like 
Quesnay, Condillac, and Say, who took up Locke’s sensationalism, but this does not emerge in 
policy discussion until the nineteenth century.57 In any case, the omission of discussion of civic 
virtue from Foucault’s account becomes especially significant when we turn to his treatment 
of Adam Ferguson.  
 
The man without qualities 
Foucault presents his account of the subject of interests primarily through a discussion of Ad-
am Ferguson. This is a strange choice, both because from the vantage point of intellectual his-
tory Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) looks like a relative backwater in the 
debates of the Scottish Enlightenment, and because Ferguson is usually regarded as on the civ-
ic republican side of a quarrel about the merits of the new commercial social formation that is 
emerging.58 As such, he’s not an obvious author to choose to demonstrate the ways in which 
the case for interests was being made. It will pay us more closely to examine the way Foucault 
dissects Ferguson’s argument.  
 Foucault begins his analysis by observing that during the late eighteenth century the 
notion of civil society was presented in a number of ways. He justifies his choice of Ferguson’s 
Essay by stating that it is “the most fundamental, almost statutory text regarding the character-
ization of civil society.”59 He claims that Ferguson delivers the political correlate of “what Ad-
am Smith studied in purely economic terms” (a moment of anachronism on Foucault’s part, 
since in the later eighteenth century arguably there were no “purely economic terms,” and a 
brief glance at Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments undermines Foucault’s hasty pigeonholing of 
                                                          
56 Marisa Linton, The Politics of Virtue in Enlightenment France (London: Palgrave, 2001). Also see Shelley 
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dans la France des Lumières et de la Révolution: mesure d’une présence,” La Révolution française, vol. 5 
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him as an economist).60 In good didactic style Foucault highlights four key features of Fergu-
son’s account: 
First, civil society understood as an historical-natural constant; second, civil society as prin-
ciple of spontaneous synthesis; third, civil society as permanent matrix of political power; 
and fourth, civil society as the motor element of history.61 
Foucault highlights the thesis of natural sociability: in Ferguson’s account “the social bond de-
velops spontaneously. [...] it is both permanent and indispensable.”62 This means that the state 
of nature is always already a social state, our natural condition is social. Spontaneous synthe-
sis in turn implies that there is no need for an explicit contract or renunciation of rights: “there 
is no constitution of sovereignty by a sort of pact of subjection.”63 Foucault comments “we are 
not dealing with a mechanism or system of the exchange of rights. We are dealing with a 
mechanism of immediate multiplication that has in fact the same form as the immediate mul-
tiplication of profit in the purely economic mechanism of interests.”64 He comments that the 
form is the same, but not the contents, and this is how “civil society can be both the support of 
the economic process and economic bonds, while overflowing them and being irreducible to 
them.”65 He observes that what joins men together in civil society “is a mechanism analogous 
to that of interests, but they are not interests in the strict sense, they are not economic interests. 
[...] In fact, what links individuals in civil society is not maximum profit from exchange, it is a 
series of what could be called ‘disinterested interests’.”66 Foucault goes on to list the features of 
instinct, sentiment, and sympathy noted by Ferguson, the “impulses of benevolence,” the 
“loathing of others,” both repugnance and pleasure at the misfortune of others, stating that 
this provides a “distinct set of non-egoist interests, a distinct interplay of non-egoist, disinter-
ested interests which is much wider than egoism itself.”67 In other words, sociability and an 
entire moral psychology is sketched in the Essay. But Foucault tends repeatedly to read back-
wards from a later separation out of economic from other interests. In other words there is an 
element of anachronism here on Foucault’s part that I think is generated partly by the typolo-
gy of homo oeconomicus as a pure form, where this is in turn generated by Foucault’s abstract 
way of working,68 partly due to the lecture format and because his overall concern is to think 
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through the history of governmentality and the relation between eighteenth and twentieth 
century liberal thought.  
 As though noting the tension between communion and commercium, Foucault then 
goes on to counterpoise the non-local character of the bonds between economic subjects and 
the localised character of civil society. Where markets will produce a “spontaneous synthesis 
of egoisms over the whole surface of the globe,” “civil society always appears as a limited en-
semble [...] civil society does not coincide with humanity in general.” Rather “Civil society, 
Ferguson says, leads the individual to enlist ‘on the side of one tribe or community’.” Foucault 
concludes that “civil society is not humanitarian but communitarian,”69 and the nation is one 
of the key forms of expression of civil society. It seems from this that “communitarian” may be 
Foucault’s take on civic republicanism; however, republicanism has different roots from na-
tionalism, the former signalling political participation and virtue, whereas the latter can rest 
on the politicization of communitarian sentiment.70 Foucault locates what he calls the econom-
ic bond as playing a strange role here, since it combines a “spontaneous convergence of inter-
ests” with a principle of “dissociation with regard to the active bonds of compassion, benevo-
lence, love for one’s fellows, and sense of community.”71 This implies, according to Foucault, 
that “the economic bond arises within civil society,” is only possible through it, “but in anoth-
er way undoes it.”72 Here Foucault puts his finger on the core argument of Ferguson’s Essay, 
without naming its republican concerns as such. He observes “the more we move towards an 
economic state, the more, paradoxically, the constitutive bond of civil society is weakened and 
the more the individual is isolated by the economic bond he has with everyone and anyone.”73 
 The third element that Foucault isolates in Ferguson’s account is “a spontaneous for-
mation of power [that][...] comes about by a de facto bond which links different concrete indi-
viduals to each other.”74 In society, some will assume authority. Thus, “the fact of power pre-
cedes the right that establishes, justifies, limits, or intensifies it; power already exists before it 
is regulated, delegated, or legally established.”75 It is here that Foucault observes “The juridical 
structure of power always comes after the event or fact of power itself.”76 Foucault adds that in 
Ferguson’s description “civil society secretes its own power that is neither its first condition 
nor its supplement.”77 The fourth characteristic of civil society is that it is the motor of history. 
Foucault outlines how the principle of association is attended by dissociation produced by 
egoism. This produces instability and dynamism, so that Ferguson talks about three stages of 
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history: savagery, barbarism and civilization. “The principle of dissociative association is also 
a principle of historical transformation.”78 Thus Foucault gives a fairly detailed and sustained 
exposition of Ferguson’s argument, but he doesn’t scrutinise it; rather it, or Foucault’s descrip-
tion of it, becomes the map of a territory he suggests is opening up.  
 For Foucault, the emergence of civil society is the “opening up of a domain of non-
juridical social relations”:  
 
civil society is characterized by bonds which are neither purely economic nor purely juridi-
cal, which cannot be superimposed on the structures of the contract and the game of rights 
conceded, delegated and alienated, and which, in their nature if not their form, are also dif-
ferent from the economic game.79 
 
 He suggests that with this notion “we enter into a completely different system of political 
thought,” with distinct features in different contexts.80 Foucault states that the kind of analysis 
found in Ferguson’s text is evidence of a “crossroads,” a moment in the formation of a domain 
of collective social units that “go beyond the purely economic bond, yet without being purely 
juridical.”81 While this polarisation of the purely economic and the purely juridical is rhetori-
cally very successful in clarifying two distinct and heterogeneous modes of the subject and its 
relation to the social bond, I want to bring into question the idea that in the eighteenth century 
there was such a thing as a “purely economic bond.” I want to suggest first that when thinking 
about the significance of Ferguson’s text the metaphor of a roundabout may be more apt than 
that of a crossroads, since there are more routes converging in Ferguson’s text than those not-
ed by Foucault. In particular I should like first to tease open the concept of “interests” a little 
more than does Foucault. Secondly, I’d like to bring into question Foucault’s positioning of 
Ferguson as a proponent of a world founded on interests.  
 In his discussion, Foucault does little to analyse the concept of “interests,” save for a 
brief reference to Hume’s innovative thinking on the matter.82 The concept of interest would 
repay much closer attention. It is of course Hirschman who provides the now classic argument 
that the eighteenth century saw the emergence of the doux commerce thesis: the argument that 
interests could be more reliable, pacific, that is governable, than the passions.83 Hirschman 
stresses that there has been “semantic drift” with respect to the concept of interests; that is, this 
concept is one with a history, a history that has been a battleground since the seventeenth cen-
tury because of its close relation to concepts of self and political power. More specifically, 
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Hirschman observes that in Hume’s account in the Essays of 1742 interest is equated with ava-
rice, but this has changed by the publication of Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 1776. Observing 
that the interested are more easily governed, that the methodical pursuit of private interest 
engenders doux commerce, Hirschman quotes Steuart “were a people to become quite disinter-
ested, there would be no possibility of governing them.”84 There is thus a governmental aspect 
to the subject of interests.85 While Foucault’s lecture helpfully locates this, there is much more 
to be said about the role of the concept of interest in the political and economic thought of this 
period.86 
 As regards the second point above, Foucault’s account of Ferguson places the latter 
firmly as a proponent of the commercial subject of interests. This is odd to say the least. Oz-
Salzberger notes the distinctiveness of Ferguson’s position. Focusing on the particular polemi-
cal import of the Essay, she observes that while on one hand it can be read as a “last ditch at-
tempt to preach antiquated moral community to a modern commercial society,”87 it can on the 
other hand be read “as a pioneering work where new things were done with old language.”88 
Carefully distinguishing jurisprudential and civic arguments, she points out that where for 
Smith and Hume a good political system rested not on civic virtue but on legislation, Ferguson 
opposed this. According to Ferguson, material progress would not secure civic virtue, in fact it 
threatened to undermine it. Ferguson thus reiterates the importance of the citizen’s militia: 
opposing the idea, propounded by Smith and Hume, that the key to maintaining a good polit-
ical system was a robust system of legislation, Ferguson holds onto the centrality of civic vir-
tue.89 This might be seen as a reactionary idea, but Oz-Salzberger interprets Ferguson’s text as 
an attempt to “dig better foundations for the civic idea of the polity”; this is why he “claimed 
for republican language a concept [civil society] which had so far served mainly in the lan-
guage of natural jurisprudence.”90 In doing so she highlights the way in which Ferguson mobi-
lises “the term civil society to halt the pillaging of civic terminology in favour of the new dis-
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course of political economy”;91 an attempted reversal of lines of force that should have inter-
ested Foucault. Oz-Salzberger notes that the text had more impact in Germany than in Scot-
land and England, and that in the former its future was “bürgerlich, not civic”;92 she concludes 
that the civic use Ferguson made of the term “civil society” made his republican position “al-
most untranslatable.”93 Ironically Foucault seems to have accepted this bürgerlich reading.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Men who forget the etymology of the words they use erase their moral logic and eventually 
de-civilize their society.94 
 
“I am not a professional historian; nobody is perfect.”95 
 
Foucault’s work is a fecund source of ideas, associations, and new ways of looking; he is origi-
nal and iconoclastic, helpful for orienting one’s thinking. His writing is perhaps not, then, best 
apprehended using the methodological protocols of the professional historian,96 but for its ca-
pacity to illuminate and spark new thought. In particular in the present context, Foucault as-
sists in our conceptualizing civil society so that it is not a rallying cry but a phenomenon re-
quiring investigation. 
 Foucault suggests that we think about concepts such as civil society by examining the 
terms of debate they hold in place: how is it, for example, that ideas of community as pre-
political and as inhering in civil society have come to dominate our political imaginations? 
Foucault’s eschewal of a normative account of civil society is a refusal of the defining constitu-
tive fiction of political community. It suggests we must look elsewhere for an account of our 
practices of government, and that we should seek to unseat the naturalness of idea(l)s of civil 
society as already existing “community,” looking instead at what the notion of civil society 
makes possible.  
Foucault’s account of the “transactional reality” that is civil society is one in which the 
subject of right and the subject of interest are simultaneously counterpoised and combined. 
This is perceptive of the ways in which we are addressed both as legal subjects and as eco-
nomic, social, and biological beings. In my view it is one of the most astute diagnoses of the 
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dilemmas of modern political rationalities available. And yet in leaving out from analysis the 
subject of virtue so vividly painted by the Scottish moralists, amongst them Ferguson, Fou-
cault documents the eighteenth century as already closing toward our present. These eight-
eenth century debates might be used, by contrast, to destabilise our dominant figures of 
thought. This was a period when concepts now ossified were in flux; retrieving their multiva-
lences and old associations, their moments of reverse discourse, may help break open the fixi-
ty of the terms of debate of the present without recourse to romantic notions of “the people.” 
This, at least, has been my hope in reading Foucault a little against himself.  
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